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Karl Sigmund: Book Review (for the American Scientist) of Herbert 
Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of 
the Behavioural Sciences, Princeton University Press (2009) 
 
           The Bounds of Reason and the Joys of Virtue  
 
Humans are social animals, and so were their ancestors, for millions 
of years before the first camp-fires lighted the night. But the 
mathematics of social interactions is a recent acquisition. It originated 
in the ‘forties of the previous century, with a book originally titled 
‘The Theory of Rational Behavior’. Its authors, the mathematician 
John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern, eventually 
re-named it ‘Game Theory and Economic Behavior’, a fortunate 
move. However, the basic assumption in this book remained 
unaffected: it postulated, as did all follow-up texts on game theory for 
generations, that players are rational. 
 
 
Three decades later, game theory experienced a new lease on life 
through the work of biologists William D Hamilton and John Maynard 
Smith. It was applied to analyse biological interactions, such as inner-
specific fights or parental investments. This new ‘evolutionary game 
theory’ was no longer based on axioms of rationality. In fact, one of 
the pillars of classical game theory, Anatol Rapaport, characterized it 
as ‘game theory without rationality’. Herbert Gintis was among the 
first economists attracted by that new field, and when, ten years ago, I 
wrote a review of his text-book on ‘Game Theory Evolving’, I 
described it as ‘testimony of the conversion of an economist’. Gintis 
has not recanted in the meantime: indeed, a second edition of that 
book just appeared. But a companion volume, entitled ‘Bounds of 
Reason’, shows that he certainly has not forgotten his upbringing in 
the orthodox vein.    
 
There is, of course, no contradiction between the two game theories. 
As with any mathematical theories, their aim is to rigorously derive 
the consequences of well-defined assumptions which are taken as 
granted. Just as there are geometries using the parallel axiom, and 
others that do not, so there are game theories using rationality axioms 
and others that do not. Mathematically, they are of equal 
respectability. It is only when they are applied to the real world that 
tensions arise. 
 
In his preface, Gintis compares the history of physics with that of 
economy. Physical theories have regularly stumbled against 
experiments revealing ‘anomalies’ which falsified them and led to 
their replacement by other theories. Compared with such an intensive 
dialogue between theory and experiment, most textbooks of classical 
economy remained singularly fact-free. This has changed recently: 
experimental economics, and in particular behavioral game theory, has 
flourished in the last decades, and ‘The Bounds of Reason’ contains 
an impressive catalogue of empirical findings. In the light of 
conventional rationality assumptions, many of them appear as 
‘anomalies’.  They are based on intriguing thought experiments 
exploring the many facets of decision making. 
 
The most venerable is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Imagine two players 
having simultaneously to decide whether to send a gift to the co-
player. Sending it costs the donor 5 dollars, and provides the recipient 
with 15 dollars. If both send their gift, they earn 10 dollars each. But 
whatever the co-player does, a player earns more by not sending the 
gift. Two rational agents who want to maximise their income will end 
up  getting nothing. The same happens if one player decides after 
being informed of the other’s decision. The Trust game is closely 
related. In this game, a coin toss decides who of the two players is the 
Investor, and who the Trustee. The Investor can send a gift to the 
Trustee, as before. The Trustee can then return part of the sum to the 
Investor. Thus both players can profit from the exchange. But rational 
players are stuck in a dead end: no gift, no return. Real players 
frequently overcome the stalemate. They trust, and honour trust, and 
mutually profit from their interaction. 
 
Another example of some entertainment value is the Traveller’s 
Dilemma. Two persons have to separately file a claim between 10 and 
100 dollars. The rules prescribe that if they both claim the same 
amount, both will get it; but if they claim separate amounts, the lower 
will be judged to be valid and paid out. As an incentive, the more 
modest claimant receives two dollars more, and the other player 
correspondingly two dollars less. Two innocent players would 
immediately claim 100, and get it. But a smart player bent on 
optimizing might hope to get one dollar more, by merely claiming 99. 
Fearing that the co-player might think along these same lines, one 
should not claim 100, because this would yield only 98.  But if both 
claim 99, that’s what they get: better to outsmart the other by claiming 
98, and pocket 100…And from then on, the argument, an instance of 
what is termed ‘backward induction’,  leads unflinchingly all the way 
down to the minimum claim of 10 dollars.  Both players are caught in 
a trap: asking for the minimum is the only solution which is consistent 
in the sense that no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from it.        
 
Needless to say, real people rarely reach this solution, in experiments: 
they may take a few steps down the ladder, but then stop well above 
90.   
 
Another classical example is known as Ellsberg paradox. Consider an 
urn containing 30 balls which can be red, black or white. All you 
know is that 10 balls are red. The number of black or white balls  is 
unknown. You now are offered to bet on a colour: if it is drawn, you 
will receive 100 dollars; else, nothing. Most people bet on red, and 
this seems hardly surprising. But if asked to bet on any combination of 
two colours, instead, most people prefer to bet on (black, white), and 
this not consistent with their former choice. In another vein, most 
people prefer a price of 10 dollars, with a 1 dollar discount, to a price 
of 8 dollars with a 1 dollar surcharge. Such framing effects are 
ubiquitous. 
 
Under the relentless impact of these empirical findings, the 
assumption of rationality has been modified in various ways. From its 
glorious state of an unreachable idealization, it has been downgraded 
to ‘bounded rationality’. This view accepts that perfect optimization 
is, in general, beyond human reach. But bounded rationality means 
different things to different people, depending on which parts of the 
ideal they want to salvage. This has given rise to interesting 
theoretical investigations into the logical dependencies of diverse 
blends. Nevertheless, many doubt that it helps to account for the 
empirical findings. The situation is reminiscent of the quandaries of 
early astronomers, who discovered, to their dismay, that planets did 
not move in perfect circles as presumed. They came to terms with this 
‘bounded circularity’ by describing the orbits as epicycles – circles 
within circles, and so on – and ingeniously deriving fairly decent 
approximations, at the cost of an explosion in sophistication and 
complexity. 
 
The version of rational agents proposed by Herbert Gintis gets rid of 
the assumption that players enjoy ‘common knowledge of rationality’. 
Thus players are all rational but need not believe that all of them are 
rational. This helps indeed to avoid the trap of backward induction. 
On the other hand, it does not explain why people are so sensitive to 
framing, or so inept at lotteries and bets. Gintis, who claims that ‘the 
bounds of reason are not the irrational, but the social’,  
dismisses anomalies involving just one single person as ‘performance 
errors’. Such a fix can explain everything and nothing, and therefore 
threatens to weaken his cause.   
 
For Gintis champions a cause, one which can be wholeheartedly 
subscribed: namely to promote game theory as an indispensable 
instrument in modelling human behavior. He rightly points out the 
wide discrepancies between the approaches in separate branches of the 
behavioural sciences: for example, economics, sociology, 
anthropology and social psychology use vastly different premises in 
studying social behaviour and organization. Such academic traditions 
(based, in Gintis’ term, on ‘virtually impassible feudal organizations’) 
are not likely to vanish overnight, but behavioral game theory can 
offer a tool for them all. In fact, we see  this happening already. To 
give a few examples: (a) the behavior in Trust games and similar 
games of cooperation is a superb ‘microsocial’ indicator for what 
sociologists call the Rule of Law (the general respect for rules and 
institutions in a society); (b) game theoretical models help in 
explaining the adaptive value of humankind’s nearly ubiquitous belief 
in supernatural agents; (c) ingenious experiments uncover our  often 
subliminal concern with being watched, which can be triggered by the 
mere image of an eye and greatly boosts cooperative behaviour; (d) 
the widely varying gift-giving traditions in small-scale societies, with 
all their attending complexities concerning obligations and status, are 
dissected by means of simple economic experiments, etc. 
 
The academic tribes, however, will hesitate in accepting the gift of 
game theory from economists if they are told that it comes with the 
rational actor model. Not everyone wants to shoulder the obligations 
that go with it. No doubt that humans have developed the faculty of 
reasoning to a unique degree; but our decisions are also guided by 
other factors, such as habits and customs, passions, emotions, and 
‘animal spirits’ (to use the expression of economist John Maynard 
Keynes). Many actions do not fall under the heading of rational 
behavior, as commonly understood (although it must be admitted that 
modern economists’ definitions of rationality are as far removed from 
the every-day use of that word, as modern theology’s concepts of 
Divinity from the average lay-person’s idea of the Good Lord).  
 
Psychologists, for instance, analyse decisions in terms of (often 
unconscious) cues and heuristics, and are not likely to switch to the 
paradigm of Beliefs, Preferences, Constraints and Expected Utilities 
which underlies the rational actor model. Why should they? In 
evolutionary game theory, they can enjoy the full panoply of 
behavioural experiments without the restraints imposed by the 
loitering presence of the rational actor. Strategies (i.e., programs of 
behaviour) need not be the product of rational decisions. They can be 
copied, for instance, through learning or inheritance. 
 
Interestingly, Gintis stresses right from the start that game theory 
is central to understanding the dynamics of all sorts of life forms, and 
touts it as ‘the universal lexicon of life’. Since it applies to primates, 
birds, lizards, plants and even bacteria, it must be able to do without 
the rational actor model. Needless to add that in applications to 
humans, we must take account of our very special cognitive and 
communicative facilities. But in the ‘Bounds of Reason’, Gintis 
allows only a marginal role for evolutionary game theory. 
Surprisingly, he hardly mentions the pioneering work of Trivers, 
Hamilton, or Axelrod. This is a pity, since what these authors have to 
say about human nature had a deep impact on most behavioral 
sciences. In the tradition of Adam Smith, evolutionary biologists 
explain cooperative behavior by long-term self-interest ultimately 
grounded on reproductive success. In particular, it can be 
advantageous to forfeit an immediate material gain if this increases 
one’s reputation, and thus promises to confer a higher value in the 
market for collaborators. The corresponding cost-benefit calculation 
need not be conscious, let alone rational; it can be mediated by 
heuristics based on emotional responses such as shame, sympathy or 
anger, and possibly rationalized after the act. 
 
Gintis embraces another approach, and explains cooperation by a 
human preference for what he terms character virtues (such as 
honesty, trustworthiness or fairness). But every behavior can be 
interpreted as a preference for some virtue. Short of providing an 
ultimate reason for the preference (e.g., that it promotes long-term 
self-interest), this approach has as little explanatory power as Gintis’ 
statement that ‘the increased incidence of prosocial behaviour is 
precisely what permits humans to cooperate effectively in groups’. 
Likewise, he postulates a genetic predisposition to follow social norms 
even when it is costly to do so. But neither the evolution of the 
predisposition nor the emergence of norms are explained. Many game 
theorists have attempted to describe collective phenomena, and in 
particular social norms or social institutions, by the actions of the 
individuals involved.  Gintis, however, rejects methodological 
individualism – the basis for such an approach – on the ground that it 
is incompatible with the characteristics of rational agents. But 
incompatibility cuts both ways. 
 
To resume, ‘The Bounds of Reason’ appear as two books in one. One 
part develops an epistemic theory of the rational actor as an alternative 
to what is provided by classical game theory, and the other part is a 
spirited plea to use behavioral game theory as unifying tool in all 
behavioral sciences. Both objectives are highly valuable, but 
combining them creates friction. Friction creates heat, and Herbert 
Gintis, who thrives gleefully on controversial issues, may have 
enjoyed the prospect of heated discussions. 
 
 
